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  OPINION 
________________                              
 
 
SMITH, Circuit Judge. 
 
 This case returns to us for resolution of the 
“important questions about the scope of the political 
question doctrine and the Federal Tort Claims Act’s 
‘combatant activities’ exception” in suits against defense 
contractors. We did not have the opportunity to reach 
these issues when this case was before us previously. 
Harris v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 618 F.3d 
398, 399 (3d Cir. 2010). Having jurisdiction now to reach 
these questions, we will provide a framework that 
establishes the contours of each of these doctrines. And 
while explaining the two frameworks can be simple, 
applying them is complicated by a number of case-by-
case factors. Illustrating this is our conclusion that one 
such crucial factor still needs to be decided before the 
political-question doctrine aspect of this case can be 
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resolved: which state’s law controls the claims and 
defenses presented. This, in addition to our conclusion 
that the combatant-activities exception does not preempt 
the plaintiffs’ claims, requires that we reverse and 
remand to the District Court for further proceedings.  
I 
 During the Iraq War, the United States military 
established the Radwaniyah Palace Complex as a base of 
operations. Staff Sergeant Ryan Maseth was stationed 
there and assigned to live in the barracks called Legion 
Security Forces Building 1, a building that predated the 
war and was known to have significant electrical 
problems. On January 2, 2008, Staff Sergeant Maseth 
died by electrocution while taking a shower in his 
barracks. The shower was electrified by an ungrounded 
and unbonded water pump.  
Staff Sergeant Maseth’s estate and his parents sued 
Kellogg, Brown & Root Services (“KBR”), a military 
contractor hired to perform certain maintenance services 
at the barracks. They allege that KBR caused Staff 
Sergeant Maseth’s death by negligently performing its 
maintenance duties under two contracts with the United 
States. According to the plaintiffs, these contracts set 
standards of care for work performed under them, which 
KBR did not meet because it failed to ground and bond 
the water pump either when KBR installed it or 
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responded to work orders complaining of electrified 
water in Staff Sergeant Maseth’s barracks. 
The merits of the plaintiffs’ claims have not yet 
been resolved. Instead, KBR raises two antecedent 
challenges through a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss. 
First, KBR argues that the District Court should not 
exercise its proper 28 U.S.C. § 1332 diversity jurisdiction 
because this case presents a nonjusticiable political 
question.  Second, KBR argues that the plaintiffs’ claims 
are preempted by the federal policy underlying the 
combatant-activities exception in 28 U.S.C. § 2860(j) to 
the United States’ waiver of sovereign immunity for 
torts. 
The District Court first denied the motion before 
extensive discovery took place. Harris v. Kellogg, Brown 
& Root Servs., Inc., 618 F. Supp. 2d 400, 403 (W.D. Pa. 
2009). KBR sought review of this denial through an 
interlocutory appeal under the collateral-order doctrine, 
which we dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction. 
Harris, 618 F.3d at 400, 404. On remand, the District 
Court ordered discovery on the plaintiffs’ claims and 
KBR’s defenses. After discovery was mostly complete, 
KBR renewed its Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss. This 
time, the District Court granted the motion, holding that 
the case was nonjusticiable and—alternatively—that the 
plaintiffs’ claims were preempted by the federal policy 
embodied in § 2680(j). Harris v. Kellogg, Brown & Root 
Servs., Inc., 878 F. Supp. 2d 543, 547–58 (W.D. Pa. 
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2012). The plaintiffs appeal the dismissal, and this Court 
has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
II 
 Jurisdictional and justiciability questions must be 
resolved before a court reaches the merits of a case. 
Larsen v. Senate of Com. of Pa., 152 F.3d 240, 245–46 
(3d Cir. 1998); see also Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia 
Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 431 (2007) 
(“Jurisdiction is vital only if the court proposes to issue a 
judgment on the merits.”). Whether a case contains a 
political question is a matter of justiciability. Gross v. 
German Found. Indus. Initiative, 456 F.3d 363, 376 (3d 
Cir. 2006). Absent complete preemption, whether a 
plaintiff’s claims are preempted relates to the merits. See 
In re U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 193 F.3d 151, 160 (3d Cir. 
1999) (explaining that “ordinary preemption” arises only 
“as a federal defense to a state-law claim”). Neither party 
argues, and no court has held, that § 2860(j) combatant-
activities preemption constitutes complete preemption. 
Accordingly, we must review the District Court’s 
political-question holding before addressing its 
preemption holding.
1
 
                                                 
1
 The parties do not discuss whether Rule 12(b)(1) was 
the appropriate vehicle for KBR to assert its § 2680(j) 
preemption argument. The District Court, however, noted 
that Rule 56 may have been the appropriate vehicle. 
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Nevertheless, it analyzed KBR’s arguments under Rule 
12(b)(1) because the plaintiffs did not dispute its 
applicability and because the District Court believed that 
“it can be reasonably inferred from [our prior decision in 
this case] that Rule 12(b)(1) is the appropriate standard.” 
Harris, 878 F. Supp. 2d at 568 & n.17. Although the 
parties do not dispute the appropriate standard, we must 
clarify that our prior decision did not imply, as the 
District Court believed, that Rule 12(b)(1) is the right 
vehicle for ordinary preemption arguments. 
As the District Court acknowledged, our first decision in 
this case did not address whether Rule 12(b)(1) was the 
appropriate vehicle in which to advance any of the 
arguments KBR has made. Id. at 568 n.17. Nevertheless, 
the District Court inferred from our statement that 
“because the presence or absence of a political question 
is such a fact-intensive inquiry, a better-developed record 
could give rise to another colorable motion to dismiss,” 
Harris, 618 F.3d at 403, one could reasonably conclude 
that Rule 12(b)(1) is the appropriate mechanism for 
making KBR’s arguments. Our prior decision’s statement 
is arguably dicta. At all events, it is nothing more than a 
statement about the appropriate procedural posture for 
analyzing political-question arguments rather than a 
statement about the method to review § 2680 preemption 
arguments. 
This narrow reading is necessary because § 2680 
 8 
 
A. The Political-Question Doctrine 
 KBR asserts its political-question argument as a 
factual challenge to the District Court’s jurisdiction. See 
Gould Elecs., Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d 
                                                                                                             
questions like the one in this case are about preemption 
rather than sovereign immunity. To be sure, § 2680 is 
often invoked under Rule 12(b)(1) because it is an 
assertion of sovereign immunity by the federal 
government, which is jurisdictional. See Smith v. Johns-
Manville Corp., 795 F.2d 301, 306 n.8 (3d Cir. 1986) 
(“The discretionary function exception [found in 28 
U.S.C. § 2680(a)] operates as a bar to jurisdiction.”). 
KBR, however, does not assert sovereign immunity. 
Instead, it argues that § 2680(j) represents a federal 
policy that preempts the plaintiffs’ claims. See Boyle, 487 
U.S. at 508–10. Preemption arguments, other than 
complete preemption, relate to the merits of the case. In 
re U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 193 F.3d at 160. Therefore, the 
appropriate procedural device for reviewing the § 2680(j) 
preemption argument is not a motion pursuant to Rule 
12(b)(1), but rather a motion under either Rule 12(b)(6) 
or for summary judgment, Fisher v. Halliburton, 667 
F.3d 602, 608–09 (5th Cir. 2012)—as the District Court 
seemed to intuit. 
The plaintiffs have waived any argument related to this 
error, however, so it is beyond the scope of our review. 
See Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). 
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Cir. 2000) (“A Rule 12(b)(1) motion may be treated as 
either a facial or factual challenge to the court’s subject 
matter jurisdiction.”). In such a challenge, the burden of 
proving that jurisdiction exists lies with the plaintiff, and 
“the trial court is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy 
itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case.” 
Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 549 F.2d 
884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977). Furthermore, “no presumptive 
truthfulness attaches to plaintiff’s allegations,” and when 
jurisdiction is intertwined with the merits, “the existence 
of disputed material facts will not preclude the trial court 
from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional 
claims.” Id.  
We exercise plenary review over the District 
Court’s legal conclusions but review its factual findings 
for clear error. CNA v. United States, 535 F.3d 132, 139 
(3d Cir. 2008). Here, the plaintiffs challenge both factual 
findings and legal conclusions. The plaintiffs’ factual 
arguments, however, are without merit because the Court 
did not make the factual findings they argue that it did.
2
 
We will thus exercise plenary review over the District 
                                                 
2
 The plaintiffs argue that the District Court erroneously 
found that KBR did not install or work on the pump that 
caused Staff Sergeant Maseth’s death. The District Court 
made no such findings. Instead, it explained that whether 
KBR did install or work on the pump could be 
reasonably disputed by the parties. 
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Court’s legal conclusion that this case presents a 
nonjusticiable political question. 
A case presents a nonjusticiable political question 
when one of the following characteristics is “inextricable 
from the case”: 
(1) a textually demonstrable constitutional 
commitment of the issue to a coordinate 
political department; (2) or a lack of 
judicially discoverable and manageable 
standards for resolving it; (3) or the 
impossibility of deciding without an initial 
policy determination of a kind clearly for 
nonjudicial discretion; (4) or the 
impossibility of a court’s undertaking 
independent resolution without expressing 
lack of the respect due coordinate branches 
of government; (5) or an unusual need for 
unquestioning adherence to a political 
decision already made; (6) or the potentiality 
of embarrassment from multifarious 
pronouncements by various departments on 
one question. 
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). KBR argues 
that resolving the plaintiffs’ claims will require judicial 
intrusion into issues textually committed to the executive, 
present issues that lack judicially manageable standards, 
and express a lack of respect due to coordinate branches 
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of government. Assessing this argument requires a 
“discriminating inquiry into the precise facts and posture 
of the particular case,” id., in a level of detail and 
complexity that is rare even in the political-question 
context.  
Often, when the political-question doctrine is 
asserted, nonjusticiability arises from the possibility that 
one branch of government has exceeded its powers and 
the court must decide whether it has the authority and 
competence to regulate the alleged abuse. See, e.g., 
Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1430–31 (2012) 
(holding that determining whether a statute allowing 
Americans born in Jerusalem to indicate Israel as their 
place of birth, which was argued to represent a 
congressional infringement on executive prerogatives, 
was not a political question). As such, when deciding 
whether a case presents a political question, we rarely 
need to look beyond the complaint and any of its obvious 
implications. 
This is not so with complaints against defense 
contractors. Defense contractors do not have independent 
constitutional authority and are not coordinate branches 
of government to which we owe deference. See Taylor v. 
Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 658 F.3d 402, 409 
(4th Cir. 2011) (recognizing that “KBR is not a part of 
the military”). Consequently, complaints against them for 
conduct that occurs while they are providing services to 
the military in a theater of war rarely, if ever, directly 
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implicate a political question. Nonetheless, these suits 
may present nonjusticiable issues because military 
decisions that are textually committed to the executive 
sometimes lie just beneath the surface of the case. For 
example, a contractor’s apparently wrongful conduct may 
be a direct result of an order from the military, 
Carmichael v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 572 
F.3d 1271, 1281–83 (11th Cir. 2009) (holding that a 
nonjusticiable issue is introduced when contractor-caused 
harm was a result of following orders from a convoy 
commander), or a plaintiff’s contributory negligence may 
be directly tied to the wisdom of an earlier military 
decision, Taylor, 658 F.3d at 411–12 (holding that a 
nonjusticiable issue is introduced when contributory 
negligence is based on the plaintiff’s disregard of an 
earlier military decision). In these situations, the political 
question appears not from the plaintiff’s claims but from 
the broader context made relevant by a contractor’s 
defenses. As such, to avoid infringing on other branches’ 
prerogatives in war-time defense-contractor cases, courts 
must apply a particularly discriminating inquiry into the 
facts and legal theories making up the plaintiff’s claims 
as well as the defendant’s defenses. Lane v. Halliburton, 
529 F.3d 548, 565 (5th Cir. 2008) (“We must look 
beyond the complaint, considering how the Plaintiffs 
might prove their claims and how KBR would defend.”). 
 
1. Textual Commitment 
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The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have provided a 
helpful framework for deciding whether a suit against a 
defense contractor contains issues textually committed to 
another branch. Because defense contractors are not 
coordinate branches of government, a determination must 
first be made whether the case actually requires 
evaluation of military decisions. If so, those military 
decisions must be of the type that are unreviewable 
because they are textually committed to the executive. 
See id. at 560; McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 
502 F.3d 1331, 1359–60 (11th Cir. 2007).3 According to 
                                                 
3
 Although the Fourth and Ninth Circuits—the only two 
circuits to have previously addressed this issue—do not 
use this framework, their analyses are consistent with it. 
In Taylor v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs., Inc., the 
Fourth Circuit decided that a marine’s negligence claim 
against KBR was nonjusticiable. 658 F.3d at 404. The 
marine was electrocuted while installing a second 
generator to a tank ramp that the military had not 
authorized. Id. Relying heavily on the Fifth and Eleventh 
Circuits’ decisions, the Fourth Circuit held that the case 
presented a political question because resolving KBR’s 
contributory-negligence defense would require 
evaluating whether the military was correct to not 
authorize the second generator installed by the marine—a 
question “beyond the scope of judicial review.” Id. 
at 411–12 & n.13. 
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KBR, this case would require judicial review of the 
military’s decisions about where to house soldiers on a 
battlefield—decisions that are unreviewable because they 
involve strategic calculi about how best to defend against 
threats. See McMahon, 502 F.3d at 1359 (“‘The strategy 
and tactics employed on the battlefield are clearly not 
subject to judicial review.’” (quoting Tiffany v. United 
States, 931 F.2d 271, 277 (4th Cir. 1991)). Consequently, 
the parties have focused on the first element of the 
framework: whether the plaintiffs’ claims can be resolved 
                                                                                                             
Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir. 1992), 
involved a suit against the United States and a defense 
contractor for shooting down a civilian airliner off the 
Iranian coast. Id. at 1330–31. The Ninth Circuit decided 
that although the suit involved “conduct [that] took place 
as part of an authorized military operation,” the suit was 
not barred by the political-question doctrine because the 
claims were for “judicially cognizable injury” that 
resulted from “military intrusion into the civilian sector.” 
Id. at 1331–31 (quoting Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 15–
16 (1972)); see also The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 
(1900) (reviewing military’s seizure of two Spanish 
fishing vessels during the Spanish-American war). 
Viewed under the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits’ 
framework, the case was justiciable because the second 
condition was not met—although the case required 
evaluation of military decisions, they were the type that 
is reviewable. 
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without evaluating these military decisions. 
Military control over a contractor’s actions is one 
common way that evaluation of strategic military 
decisions becomes necessary. Military control requires 
evaluation of military decisions because if the contractor 
is simply doing what the military ordered it to do, then 
review of the contractor’s actions necessarily includes 
review of the military order directing the action. See 
Carmichael, 572 F.3d at 1281–83 (holding that a suit for 
damages arising from a convoy crash included a 
nonjusticiable issue because of the degree of control the 
military had over the convoy, such as selection of path, 
speed, and distance between vehicles). However, where 
the military does not exercise control but merely provides 
the contractor with general guidelines that can be 
satisfied at the contractor’s discretion, contractor actions 
taken within that discretion do not necessarily implicate 
unreviewable military decisions. See McMahon, 502 F.3d 
at 1360–61 (holding that a defense contract for aviation 
transportation in Afghanistan did not include sufficient 
military control to introduce a political question because 
the contractor retained authority over the type of plane, 
flight path, and safety of the flight).  
In this case, the contracts between the military and 
KBR fit within the latter category. They provide KBR 
with significant discretion over how to complete 
authorized work orders. This discretion is best evidenced 
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by the lack of detailed instructions in the work orders
4
 
and the lack of military involvement in completing 
authorized work orders. See id. Military control over 
KBR’s relevant activities therefore does not introduce an 
unreviewable military decision into the case. 
Our analysis does not end here however. Plaintiffs’ 
claims might still present unreviewable military decisions 
if proving those claims or KBR’s defenses necessarily 
requires evaluating such decisions. See Taylor, 658 F.3d 
at 410–12. Accordingly, we must review every claim and 
defense in the case. Ultimately, whether the claims or 
defenses introduce a political question depends on which 
state’s law applies. We will thus remand so the District 
Court may undergo a choice-of-law analysis. 
a) The Plaintiffs’ Claims 
                                                 
4
 For example, one work order contained the problem 
complained of—“pipes (shower & sink) have voltage[,] 
get shocked in shower & sink”—but did not instruct 
KBR how to solve this problem. J.A. at 2013. KBR 
marked the project complete but did not explain what it 
did. J.A. at 2014. And when the military gave directions, 
those directions were quite minimal. See J.A. at 2015 
(work order to solve “[w]ater pump leaking on top of 
bldg thru roof” that directs KBR to fix by “replac[ing] 
pressure switch”). 
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The plaintiffs’ claims center on KBR’s failure to 
ground or bond the water pump when KBR allegedly 
installed or maintained the pump. As to installation, the 
plaintiffs allege that if KBR installed the pump, then it 
was negligent for not grounding or bonding the pump as 
required by the standard of care set by KBR’s contract 
with the military. As to maintenance of the pump, the 
plaintiffs allege that (1) KBR had a contractual duty to 
respond to work orders with safe work, (2) soldiers in 
Staff Sergeant Maseth’s barracks complained of shocks 
that were reported to KBR in authorized work orders, (3) 
KBR could have eliminated the risk of electrocution 
under these work orders, but (4) it was negligent in 
failing to eliminate or recognize that risk.
5
 Although 
determining the validity of these claims will require 
acknowledgement of some strategic military decisions, 
neither theory requires second-guessing the wisdom of 
those decisions. 
                                                 
5
 The plaintiffs did include several other claims in their 
complaint, which the District Court dismissed because 
they directly called into question strategic military 
decisions. Harris, 878 F. Supp. 2d at 574. These liability 
theories were the failure to warn, remedy the risk, rewire 
the building, provide safe alternatives, and properly 
maintain the facility. Id. We do not understand the 
plaintiffs to appeal this ruling because their briefs focus 
solely on the theories explained above.  
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The installation theory is based on KBR’s alleged 
installation of the pump between March 2006 and 
February 2007. At that time, KBR was operating under a 
CENTCOM
6
 contract with the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers. This contract acknowledged that “[e]xisting 
. . . electrical systems are in poor condition” and required 
KBR only to maintain the systems in their “existing” 
state. J.A. at 1645. Nonetheless, any completed electrical 
work was required to “operate as originally intended and 
designed, and in a safe manner.” J.A. at 1644. The parties 
dispute what “safe manner” means. KBR argues that it is 
not associated with any particular standard, while the 
plaintiffs argue that it refers to American and British 
electrical safety standards. So if the plaintiffs can show 
that KBR actually installed the pump—a disputed factual 
question—then whether KBR was negligent depends 
entirely on the standard of care established by the 
contract.  
To be sure, determining that standard will require a 
court to interpret the contract, which may require 
testimony from military officials. But such testimony 
would do no more than provide information about how to 
interpret the term “safe manner”; their testimony would 
not require the fact finder to determine whether the 
                                                 
6
 CENTCOM stands for United States Central 
Command—the United States’ military command in the 
Middle East. 
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military was negligent in setting the “safe manner” 
standard in the contract. And once the meaning of “safe 
manner” is determined, evaluating whether KBR’s work 
complied with that standard is a factual question for the 
fact finder—a question that, again, does not require 
evaluating any military decision. The plaintiff’s 
installation theory therefore does not require evaluating 
any unreviewable military decisions.  
  The same is true for the plaintiffs’ maintenance 
theory. KBR allegedly performed, or should have 
performed, maintenance to the pump under a different 
contract, the LOGCAP
7
 III, Statement of Work and Task 
Order 139. This contract divided buildings located on the 
base into three categories—Level A, B, or C. KBR was 
tasked with refurbishing and providing preventative 
maintenance to Level A buildings. However, for Level B 
buildings like the one in which Staff Sergeant Maseth 
was electrocuted, KBR was not to perform preventative 
maintenance—it was required only to complete 
maintenance requested through work orders. These work 
orders were initiated through complaints submitted to on-
base field officers, known as “camp mayors,” who would 
                                                 
7
 LOGCAP—the Logistics Civil Augmentation 
Program—is a program to “preplan for the use of civilian 
contractors to perform selected [support] services in 
wartime to augment Army forces.” U.S. Army 
Regulation 700-137 § 1-1 (1985). 
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review the complaints and submit work orders to KBR if 
the work was to cost less than a fixed amount. J.A. at 
1718. If a work order exceeded KBR’s contractual 
authority, then KBR was to return it to the camp mayor. 
J.A. at 1718. 
 According to the plaintiffs’ maintenance theory, 
KBR should have properly grounded and bonded the 
pump when it responded to one of several work orders. 
Although none of these work orders requested 
maintenance on the pump that caused Staff Sergeant 
Maseth’s death, the plaintiffs argue that KBR’s 
completion of other work orders complaining of shocks 
in the same building is circumstantial evidence that KBR 
must have (or, at least, should have) performed some 
maintenance on that water pump.
8
  
                                                 
8
 Underlying their argument that KBR must have 
performed this maintenance is a factual dispute over 
whether KBR could have performed such maintenance 
within the scope of the contract. Resolving this issue 
depends on whether the maintenance would have 
required KBR to rewire the entire building or just to 
ground and bond the water pumps—the former is 
presumably beyond the cost constraints of the contract 
while the latter is not. This is a question for the fact 
finder to resolve through evaluation of the competing 
experts’ testimony. 
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This theory, like the installation theory, is based 
solely on whether KBR satisfied its contract duties. The 
plaintiffs do not, for example, argue that the military 
should have categorized Staff Sergeant Maseth’s 
barracks as Level A or should have submitted a work 
order for the pump. They argue only that KBR failed to 
satisfy the contractual standards for maintaining Level B 
buildings. The LOGCAP contract’s standard of care is 
currently unresolved—this time because the contract is 
silent on the question. Interpreting the contract’s standard 
of care will again require applying principles of contract 
interpretation, and may require some military officers to 
testify. But just like the installation theory, this 
interpretive question can be resolved without second-
guessing military decisions.  
As a result, neither of the plaintiffs’ liability 
theories requires evaluating the wisdom of the military’s 
decisions. Accordingly, neither justifies dismissing this 
case on political-question grounds.  
b) KBR’s Assumption-of-the-Risk Defense 
While the plaintiffs’ liability theories do not 
implicate strategic military decisions, KBR asserts three 
defenses that may: assumption of the risk, proximate 
cause, and contributory negligence. When analyzing 
whether a proposed defense implicates a nonjusticiable 
issue in a Rule 12(b)(1) factual challenge, courts must 
first decide whether the defendant has “present[ed] 
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sufficient evidence to permit a jury to conclude that he 
established the [elements of the] defense by a 
preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. Stewart, 
185 F.3d 112, 125 (3d Cir. 1999). If there is sufficient 
evidence to support the defense, then the District Court 
must determine whether the defense actually presents a 
nonjusticiable issue. If it does introduce such an issue, 
then the case is dismissed.
9
 But if there is insufficient 
evidence to support the defense, or if the defense does 
not present a nonjusticiable issue, then the case goes 
forward. Applying this framework, we conclude that 
KBR’s assumption-of-the-risk defense is justiciable 
because that defense does not require evaluating 
unreviewable military decisions. Yet KBR’s contributory 
negligence and proximate cause defenses may present 
nonjusticiable issues, depending on which state’s law 
                                                 
9
 The parties do not dispute that the introduction of a 
nonjusticiable issue by a defense requires the dismissal of 
the entire case rather than elimination of the defense. 
This assumption is also made by several of our sister 
courts of appeals. See, e.g., Taylor, 658 F.3d at 409; 
Carmichael, 572 F.3d at 1292; Lane, 529 F.3d at 565. 
We follow suit and, at least for now, adopt this 
assumption. But we acknowledge that dismissing the 
entire case is not the only possible conclusion, as 
evidenced by the remedy for the introduction of 
nonjusticiable issues by damages estimates discussed in 
Part II.A.1.c infra. 
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applies. 
The District Court analyzed KBR’s assumption-of-
the-risk defense under Pennsylvania law.
10
 This defense 
bars any recovery if a defendant can show that the 
injured party knew of the dangerous condition, which 
was both obvious and avoidable, yet still voluntarily 
encountered it. Kaplan v. Exxon Corp., 126 F.3d 221, 
226 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting Carrender v. Fitterer, 469 
                                                 
10
 The District Court has not yet determined if 
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, or Texas law applies. Harris, 
878 F. Supp. 2d at 567. It sensibly restricted its analysis 
of KBR’s assumption-of-the-risk defense to Pennsylvania 
law because the parties relied on it alone and because this 
defense is not available under Tennessee and Texas law. 
Id. at 567 & n.32; see also Del Lago Partners, Inc. v. 
Smith, 307 S.W.3d 762, 772 n.34 (Tex. 2010) (explaining 
that in Farley v. M.M. Cattle Co., 529 S.W.2d 751, 758 
(Tex. 1978), the Texas Supreme Court “abolish[ed] 
implied assumption of the risk but retain[ed] [the] 
affirmative defense of express assumption of the risk”—
the latter of which is when a plaintiff “explicitly consents 
to take personal responsibility for potential injury-
causing risks”); Baggett v. Bedford Cnty., 270 S.W.3d 
550, 554 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008) (explaining that “[t]he 
Tennessee Supreme Court abolished the defense of 
implied assumption of risk in [Perez v. McConkey, 872 
S.W.2d 897, 905 (Tenn. 1994)]”).   
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A.2d 120, 125 (Pa. 1983)). Voluntariness requires that 
the injured party “had a real ‘choice.’” Id. (citing Howell 
v. Clyde, 620 A.2d 1107, 1112 (Pa. 1993)). KBR argues 
that Staff Sergeant Maseth assumed the risk of 
electrocution because when he took the fatal shower, he 
was aware of the risks of taking a shower in his barracks 
but chose to do so despite the military’s provision of safe 
alternative showering facilities. KBR is entitled to 
present this defense to a jury because it has presented 
evidence supporting Staff Sergeant Maseth’s awareness 
of and voluntary exposure to the risk of electrocution. 
Importantly, the voluntariness of his choice to use the 
shower is evidenced by the availability of alternative 
showering facilities provided by the military. 
The District Court found that analyzing 
voluntariness would draw strategic military decisions 
into the case because it would require the plaintiffs 
“either [to] admit that Maseth voluntarily encountered the 
risk in the shower, an admission which would undermine 
their case, or [to] take the position that his actions were 
involuntary such that he was acting in response to 
military orders and directly challenge the military’s 
decision concerning the shower facilities which were 
made available to him at the base.” Harris, 878 F. Supp 
2d at 587. But those are not the only possibilities. The 
plaintiffs may argue, for instance, that the alternative 
facilities were not available to Staff Sergeant Maseth or, 
if they were, that he was not aware of them. If either of 
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these propositions is true, then he could not have avoided 
the risk under Pennsylvania law. Neither of these 
arguments implicates strategic military decisions. 
Whether the military should have provided Staff Sergeant 
Maseth with alternative showering facilities, as KBR 
intends to argue, is entirely irrelevant to whether such 
facilities were available to him and, if they were, whether 
he was aware of them. Furthermore, although the 
evidence appears to weigh against them, the plaintiffs 
may still dispute whether Staff Sergeant Maseth was 
aware of the risk, which has nothing to do with 
unreviewable military decisions. KBR’s assumption-of-
the-risk defense thus does not introduce a nonjusticiable 
question because the merits of this defense depend solely 
on facts that do not implicate strategic military decisions. 
c) KBR’s Proximate-Cause Defense 
KBR also argues that its proximate-cause defense 
makes this case nonjusticiable. KBR emphasizes its 
intent to argue that the military’s actions were the sole 
cause of Staff Sergeant Maseth’s death. A variation of 
this defense, which the District Court referred to, is the 
ability of KBR to argue that the military was a proximate 
cause of the death. The District Court found that both 
versions of KBR’s proximate-cause defense would 
require evaluating military judgments.  
KBR has presented sufficient evidence to support 
both of these defenses. Under relevant state law, a 
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defendant can avoid liability by demonstrating that a 
third party is the true proximate cause of the harm. 
Harris, 796 F. Supp. 2d at 658–60 (collecting cases). 
KBR has presented sufficient evidence to support its 
argument that the military, rather than KBR, was the 
exclusive proximate cause of Staff Sergeant Maseth’s 
death. Under both contracts between KBR and the 
military, the parties shared responsibility for maintaining 
buildings in the Radwaniyah Palace Complex. The 
military retained authority to perform its own 
maintenance. See, e.g., J.A. at 701 (recording Specialist 
Michael Skaggs’ testimony regarding maintenance work 
he completed while serving in the complex). 
Furthermore, the military was ultimately responsible for 
life support functions at the base—which is exemplified 
by the military’s retention of authority to approve 
projects before KBR could perform any work and by 
occasional decisions to ignore KBR’s maintenance 
advice. See, e.g., J.A. at 649 (explaining that Level B 
facilities were to be maintained only on request); J.A. 
at 500 (recounting KBR’s initial desire to estimate a 
Level A maintenance cost for the barracks that the 
military rejected). 
This shared responsibility leaves open the 
possibility that the military alone caused Staff Sergeant 
Maseth’s death. As the District Court explained, KBR 
could prove that the military is the sole cause if the 
military (1) installed the pump improperly and never 
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subsequently grounded or bonded it, (2) performed 
maintenance on the pump that caused it to be ungrounded 
and unbonded, (3) never provided KBR the authority to 
fix it because it was outside of the contract’s scope, or 
(4) never submitted a work order to fix the pump. Any of 
these possibilities would mean that KBR had no 
contractual duty to repair the pump. Because KBR has 
provided sufficient evidence of these possibilities, this 
defense may go forward. 
The plaintiffs argue that the defense that the 
military was a proximate cause is unavailable because 
the relevant evidence shows only military actions that are 
outside of the scope of their claims, and whose 
connection to this case is too attenuated to be a proximate 
cause. Deciding whether a party is a proximate cause 
varies slightly between the relevant states. The District 
Court has determined that Iraqi law does not apply but 
has not decided if Pennsylvania, Tennessee, or Texas law 
applies. Harris, 878 F. Supp 2d at 567. Starting with 
Texas law, defendants are the proximate cause of an 
injury if their conduct was the cause in fact of the harm 
suffered and if the harm is the foreseeable result of that 
conduct. Travis v. City of Mesquite, 830 S.W.2d 94, 98 
(Tex. 1992). Harm is foreseeable when “the actor, as a 
person of ordinary intelligence, should have anticipated 
the dangers that his negligent act created for others.” Id.  
Electrocution was a reasonably foreseeable result 
of several strategic military decisions. The military was 
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aware that the buildings in the Radwaniyah Palace 
Complex had substandard electrical systems that posed 
the specific risk of electrocution in shower facilities. J.A. 
at 324 (discussing the military’s warning to troops about 
the risks of electrocution from showers in existing 
buildings); J.A. 431–32 (recording the statement of an 
Army general explaining that the military was aware of 
the risks of placing troops in existing buildings); J.A. 
at 1645 (recognizing in the contract that the electrical 
systems were in poor condition). Nevertheless, the 
military chose to assign personnel to live in these 
barracks because the risk of electrocution was minor 
compared to the risks from external threats, such as 
missile and mortar attacks. J.A. at 432. From KBR’s 
perspective, the military foresaw the exact harm suffered 
by Staff Sergeant Maseth. Indeed, KBR’s argument is 
bolstered by the military’s decision to contract with KBR 
to repair the electrical problems in buildings like Staff 
Sergeant Maseth’s only in response to a work order, even 
though (1) KBR initially recommended that Staff 
Sergeant Maseth’s barracks be categorized as Level A, 
(2) KBR informed the military of the barracks’ 
significant electrical problems, J.A. at 500, and (3) the 
military was aware of shocking in the building from 
service-member complaints.  
KBR argues that the military therefore must have 
anticipated that electrocutions were a risk of its decision 
not to categorize the building Level A and not to have 
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KBR repair the building’s electrical system. See J.A. 
at 433 (recounting a general’s testimony that an event 
like Staff Sergeant Maseth’s death could have occurred 
in any number of facilities throughout Iraq because of 
military decisions). Additionally, these decisions 
establish cause in fact: but for the military’s decisions to 
house troops in dangerous buildings that were not to be 
repaired, the staff sergeant’s death would not have 
occurred. KBR has therefore presented sufficient 
evidence to invoke its proximate-cause defense under 
Texas law.  
The same is true under Pennsylvania and 
Tennessee law. Although the tests are not identical, both 
states essentially ask whether “(1) the tortfeasor’s 
conduct must have been a ‘substantial factor’ in bringing 
about the harm being complained of; and (2) there is no 
rule or policy that should relieve the wrongdoer from 
liability because of the manner in which the negligence 
has resulted in the harm.” Hale v. Ostrow, 166 S.W.3d 
713, 719 (Tenn. 2005) (evaluating proximate cause based 
on these two factors and whether the harm could have 
been reasonably foreseen are considered in evaluating 
proximate cause); see also Lux v. Gerald E. Ort 
Trucking, Inc., 887 A.2d 1281, 1287 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2005) (evaluating proximate cause based only on these 
two factors). The second of these elements is essentially 
the same as the foreseeability analysis under Texas law, 
see Wisniewski v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 323 A.2d 
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744, 748 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1974) (citing Majors v. 
Brodhead Hotel, 205 A.2d 873 (Pa. 1965)), so KBR has 
adduced sufficient evidence to satisfy this element for the 
same reasons it can show foreseeability under Texas law.  
As to the first element, whether the military’s 
decisions were a “substantial factor” depends on three 
factors:  
(a) the number of other factors which 
contribute in producing the harm and the 
extent of the effect which they have in 
producing it; 
(b) whether the actor’s conduct has created a 
force or series of forces which are in 
continuous and active operation up to the 
time of the harm, or has created a situation 
harmless unless acted upon by other forces 
for which the actor is not responsible; [and] 
(c) lapse of time. 
Lux, 887 A.2d at 1287. KBR’s evidence supports a 
finding that these factors show that the military was a 
substantial factor in Staff Sergeant Maseth’s death. The 
first factor, which is based on the Second Restatement of 
Torts, asks whether there is one event that had such a 
“predominant effect” that it should foreclose liability for 
other events that contributed to the harm. Restatement 
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(Second) of Torts § 433 cmt. d. The evidence 
demonstrates that there are at least two events that 
contributed to the staff sergeant’s death: the military’s 
maintenance decisions despite the known electrical 
problems and KBR’s alleged negligent response to the 
work orders. Yet even if KBR’s negligence caused the 
harm, it is difficult to see why the negligence is so 
predominant that it should foreclose any fault that is 
plausibly attributable to the military for knowingly 
placing service members in buildings with dangerous 
electrical systems.  
KBR has also presented sufficient evidence on the 
second and third factors. As to the second factor, the 
military’s decisions were a “continuous and active” force 
“up to the time of the harm,” Lux, 887 A.2d at 1287, 
because they created the environment for the harm to 
occur and made electrocution likely to occur by using the 
barracks with substandard electrical wiring. As to the 
third factor, KBR has shown no “lapse of time,” Lux, 887 
A.2d at 1287, because these military decisions were 
essentially ongoing, as evidenced by the military’s 
continual inaction regarding a technical inspection report 
from KBR two months before Staff Sergeant Maseth 
died. See J.A. at 525–27.  
All of this is to say that KBR has adduced 
sufficient evidence to present its defenses that the 
military’s housing and maintenance decisions were at 
least a proximate cause of the death and that they were 
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the proximate cause. Left unanswered, however, is 
whether either of these defenses present a nonjusticiable 
issue because they require evaluating unreviewable 
military decisions.  
KBR’s defense that the military was the sole cause 
of Staff Sergeant Maseth’s death does not require such an 
evaluation. As discussed above, KBR can successfully 
use this defense if it proves any of the following: that the 
military (rather than KBR) installed or performed faulty 
maintenance on the pump, that fixing the electrified 
showers was beyond the scope of KBR’s contract, or that 
no work order was ever submitted that would have 
required grounding or bonding of the pump or given 
KBR reason to notice that it should be. Unsurprisingly, 
several of these possibilities are related to existing factual 
disputes between the parties. They disagree over whether 
KBR installed the pump, could have fixed the problem 
within the scope of the second contract, or responded to 
work orders that would have required work on the 
specific pump that caused Staff Sergeant Maseth’s death. 
Resolving these disputes—and thus whether the cause of 
the death was the sole fault of the military—does not 
require evaluating military decisions. All of these 
disputes are simply about who did what, and whether 
KBR could have performed the work it failed to do under 
the contract.  
To be sure, resolving these disputes will require 
submission of evidence that the military could have 
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installed or maintained the pump. Such evidence might 
include the military’s shared responsibility for 
maintaining life-support systems on the base and its 
occasional performance of maintenance that contradicted 
KBR’s recommendations. But the submission of 
evidence related to strategic military decisions that are 
necessary background facts for resolving a case involving 
a defense contractor is not sufficient to conclude that a 
case involves an issue textually committed to the 
executive. Instead, the case must require evaluation of 
those decisions such that the fact finder is asked to 
reexamine their wisdom. See McMahon, 502 F.3d 
at 1359–61 (explaining that a claim must require 
“reexamination” of a military decision before holding 
that the claim at issue did not implicate the political-
question doctrine even though military decisions were 
relevant to the case). KBR’s defense that the military was 
the sole cause of Staff Sergeant Maseth’s death does not 
require such an evaluation because the disputes are 
entirely factual: KBR did or did not install or maintain 
the pump, did or did not have authority under the contract 
to fix the showers, and did or did not receive a work 
order that would have required it to fix the pump. The 
District Court thus erred when it concluded that resolving 
this defense would require determining whether the 
military was negligent. 
The other variation of KBR’s proximate-cause 
defense—that the military was a proximate cause of Staff 
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Sergeant Maseth’s death—is another matter. It may 
require evaluation of strategic military decisions, and 
those questions turn on state law. If a jurisdiction uses a 
proportional-liability system which assigns liability by 
the degree of fault, then a proximate-cause defense 
introduces a nonjusticiable issue. In such a system, there 
is simply no way to determine damages without 
evaluating military decisions. The fact finder cannot 
decide the respective degrees of fault as between a 
military contractor like KBR and the military without 
evaluating the decisions made by each—particularly, the 
military’s decisions to house troops in unsafe barracks 
that would not be repaired. See Fisher v. Halliburton, 
667 F.3d 602, 621–22 (5th Cir. 2012) (explaining that 
Texas’s proportional-liability system could introduce a 
political question but resolving the case on other 
grounds). 
Tennessee and Texas use proportional-liability 
systems. McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52, 56 
(Tenn. 1992); Tex Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 33.004. So 
if Tennessee or Texas law applies, then damages cannot 
be estimated without evaluating unreviewable military 
decisions.
11
 Under Pennsylvania law, however, joint-and-
                                                 
11
 This conclusion depends on the ability of fact finders 
to assign fault to immune parties, such as the 
government. Both states permit this. The Tennessee 
Supreme Court appears to have never dealt with the 
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several liability would apply. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7102(b) 
(West 2004); Act No. 2011-17, 195th Pa. Gen. Assemb. 
(2011) (eliminating joint-and-several liability for actions 
that accrue after the law’s enactment).12 So if 
Pennsylvania law controls, then calculation of damages 
does not require evaluating strategic military decisions 
because the plaintiffs are free to obtain the entirety of 
                                                                                                             
assignment of fault to the government but has stated 
frequently that “a jury may generally apportion fault to 
immune nonparties.” Carroll v. Whitney, 29 S.W.3d 14, 
19 (Tenn. 2000). The Texas Supreme Court does not 
appear to have dealt with this question, but one 
intermediate appellate court has stated that the relevant 
Texas statute allows assignment of fault to immune 
nonparties. In re Unitec Elevator Servs. Co., 178 S.W.3d 
53, 56 n.5 (Tex. App. 2005). 
12
 The liability rule could differ for other cases governed 
by Pennsylvania law because the state only recently 
eliminated joint-and-several liability for many torts. Act 
No. 2011-17, 195th Pa. Gen. Assemb. § 1 (2011). But 
this change only “appl[ies] to causes of action which 
accrue on or after the effective date of this section [June 
28, 2011].” Id. at § 3. Staff Sergeant Maseth was killed 
on January 2, 2008. So the causes of action in this case 
accrued before, rather than “on or after,” June 28, 2011. 
Pennsylvania’s old rule of joint-and-several liability 
would apply. 
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their relief from KBR. See Maloney v. Valley Med. 
Facilities, Inc., 984 A.2d 478, 488–89 (Pa. 2009). 
Whether KBR’s proximate-cause defense 
implicates a nonjusticiable issue thus depends on which 
state law controls. If the District Court decides that 
Pennsylvania law applies, then the defense does not 
introduce any nonjusticiable issues. But if the Court 
decides that either Tennessee or Texas law applies, then 
the defense will introduce such an issue. Even if 
Tennessee or Texas law applies, though, only the fact 
finder’s calculation of damages would be nonjusticiable. 
This means that we can extract the nonjusticiable issue in 
a manner that possibly preserves some of the plaintiffs’ 
claims by dismissing only the damages claims that rely 
on proportional liability. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 217; 
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 517–18 (1969). 
Accordingly, if the District Court determines that 
Tennessee or Texas law applies, then it should not 
dismiss the case. Instead, it should foreclose the plaintiffs 
from obtaining the types of damages that are assigned 
using proportional liability but allow the plaintiffs to 
proceed on any damages claim that does not implicate 
proportional liability (such as nominal damages, if 
available).  
Eliminating the plaintiffs’ claims for these 
damages is the appropriate solution to the introduction of 
a political question by KBR’s defense because remedies, 
unlike breaches of a duty owed, can be extricated from a 
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case. We are mindful that the test from Baker is that one 
of the listed factors must be “inextricable from the case.” 
369 U.S. at 217. This suggests that if an issue can be 
extracted from the case, then the case should be 
permitted to proceed with that issue removed—which is 
exactly what the District Court is directed to do if 
Tennessee or Texas law applies.  
Powell v. McCormack also suggests that this is the 
correct approach. There, the Supreme Court analyzed 
federal courts’ ability to “mold effective relief” 
separately from “whether the duty asserted can be 
judicially identified and its breach judicially determined.” 
395 U.S. at 517–18 (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 198). 
Importantly, when discussing the ability to provide relief, 
the Court avoided deciding whether the request for 
injunctive relief introduced a nonjusticiable issue. 
Instead, it determined that the plaintiff’s request for 
declaratory relief was justiciable. Id. This suggests that 
when the request for one type of remedy is foreclosed by 
the political-question doctrine, plaintiffs may proceed if 
they are seeking other damages that do not implicate the 
doctrine. Accordingly, because KBR’s argument that the 
military was a proximate cause implicates unreviewable 
strategic military decisions only because of the necessity 
of apportioning fault, the plaintiffs may still proceed if 
they seek any relief that does not implicate the 
proportional-liability system. 
d) KBR’s Contributory-Negligence Defenses 
 38 
 
Whether KBR’s contributory-negligence defense 
presents a nonjusticiable issue also turns on the 
applicable state law. KBR argues that it is not liable 
because Staff Sergeant Maseth acted negligently when he 
decided to take a shower in his barracks despite allegedly 
knowing of the risk. Contributory negligence allows 
defendants to avoid liability if they can show that the 
injured party’s own negligence caused more than 
50 percent of the harm.
13
 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 7102 
(providing that a plaintiff’s negligence is not a bar to 
recovery if “such negligence was not greater than the 
causal negligence of the defendant”); McIntyre, 833 
S.W.2d at 57 (holding that a plaintiff’s negligence bars 
recovery only if it is not “less than . . . the defendant’s 
negligence”); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. § 33.001 
(providing that “a claimant may not recover damages if 
                                                 
13
 The denomination of this defense is confusing because 
of state variations. While several states refer to it as 
“contributory negligence,” see, e.g., Boyle v. Indep. Lift 
Truck, Inc., 6 A.3d 492, 496 (Pa. 2010), others refer to it 
as “modified-comparative negligence,” see, e.g., 
McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W2d 52, 57 (Tenn. 1992). 
We use the term “contributory negligence” primarily 
because that is how the parties refer to it.  
Although KBR does not currently make a comparative-
negligence argument, our analysis of its contributory-
negligence defense would apply to it with equal force. 
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his percentage of responsibility is greater than 50 
percent”). KBR has presented sufficient evidence from 
which a reasonable jury could find that Staff Sergeant 
Maseth was aware of the electrocution risk and that safe 
alternative showering facilities were available. Such 
evidence could lead a fact finder to conclude that the 
staff sergeant was negligent in using the barracks shower.  
This defense might require evaluation of strategic 
military decisions. To determine whether Staff Sergeant 
Maseth’s alleged negligence caused more than 50 percent 
of the harm, the degree of causation that can be assigned 
as between the military’s alleged negligence and KBR’s 
alleged negligence must also be determined. That is, the 
proportion of the injured party’s fault cannot be decided 
without also effectively deciding the extent to which the 
negligence of other parties caused the harm. For 
example, the relevant Pennsylvania Suggested Standard 
Civil Jury Instruction requires that the jury determine if 
the plaintiff’s negligence is greater than 50 percent by 
assigning fault to each defendant and then to the plaintiff. 
Pa. Bar Inst. Bd. of Dirs., Pennsylvania Suggested 
Standard Civil Jury Instructions § 13.230 (4th ed. 2008). 
That means that for the fact finder to find that Staff 
Sergeant Maseth was, say, 60 percent at fault, the fact 
finder would have to assign fault to KBR and the military 
individually that summed to 40 percent. This assignment 
of fault to the military inevitably would require 
evaluating the wisdom of the strategic military decisions 
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that caused the death.
14
 This defense therefore might 
require evaluation of strategic military decisions and 
make this case nonjusticiable.  
Whether it does, however, depends on whether 
state law allows the fact finder to assign fault to 
nonparties and whether Staff Sergeant Maseth was 
negligent. The military is not a party to this suit and, as 
explained, the source of the nonjusticiable issue in 
KBR’s contributory-negligence defense is the need to 
assign fault to the military to determine whether Staff 
Sergeant Maseth was more than 50 percent responsible 
for the harm suffered. So if state law does not permit the 
assignment of fault to nonparties, then KBR’s defense 
does not require assigning fault to the military or 
evaluating strategic military decisions. As mentioned 
above, it is yet to be determined if Pennsylvania, 
                                                 
14
 Because this defense introduces a nonjusticiable issue 
through the assignment of fault to the military, for KBR 
to rely on this as a basis for dismissing this case on 
political-question grounds, it must first present sufficient 
evidence from which a reasonable jury could assign some 
fault to the military for Staff Sergeant Maseth’s death. 
For the reasons explained in the analysis of KBR’s 
proximate-cause defense, KBR has met that standard by 
presenting evidence that the military’s strategic decisions 
were negligent and a proximate cause of the death. See 
supra Part II.A.1.c. 
 41 
 
Tennessee, or Texas law applies in this case. Harris, 
878 F. Supp 2d at 567. These states differ on whether a 
nonparty can be assigned fault by a fact finder deciding if 
a plaintiff’s fault is greater than other tortfeasors’. As a 
result, the District Court must determine which state’s 
law applies before it can resolve whether KBR’s defense 
introduces a nonjusticiable issue. 
Pennsylvania does not permit assigning fault to 
nonparties for the purpose of contributory-negligence 
defenses. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 7102 (providing that a 
plaintiff’s negligence bars recovery if it is “greater than 
the causal negligence of the defendant or defendants 
against whom recovery is sought” (emphasis added)); 
Kelly v. Carborundum Co., 453 A.2d 624, 627 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1982) (rejecting the defendant’s argument that 
§ 7102 permits “apportionment among all tortfeasors 
causally responsible for an injury” and explaining that 
the statute “merely provides for apportionment among 
those defendants against whom recovery is allowed”).15 
                                                 
15
 See also Thornton v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth., 4 A.3d 
1143, 1153 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2010) (“A plaintiff’s 
recovery is barred only if his contributory negligence is 
greater than the causal negligence of the defendants 
against whom recovery is sought.”); Heckendorn v. 
Consol. Rail Corp., 465 A.2d 609, 612 (Pa. 1983) (“[I]t 
is clear that in the Comparative Negligence Act the 
legislature did not contemplate an apportionment of 
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So if Pennsylvania law applies, then KBR’s contributory-
negligence defense—like its proximate-cause defense—
does not introduce a nonjusticiable issue.  
Tennessee and Texas, however, are another matter. 
These states permit fault to be assigned to nonparties for 
the purposes of contributory negligence. See Mullins v. 
State, 294 S.W.3d 529, 536 (Tenn. 2009) (explaining two 
principles of Tennessee tort law, which “are that all 
tortfeasors must be joined in the suit unless joinder is 
specifically prohibited by law . . . and that parties may 
assert, as an affirmative defense, that another party or 
even a non-party is responsible for the plaintiff’s 
injuries”); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. § 33.001 (providing 
that “a claimant may not recover damages if his 
percentage of responsibility is greater than 50 percent”); 
id. § 33.003 (providing that fact finders must assign 
responsibility to “each claimant; each defendant; each 
settling person; and each responsible third party who has 
been designated under § 33.004 [which contains several 
procedural requirements]”); Martin K. Eby Const. Co. v. 
LAN/STV, 350 S.W.3d 675, 680 (Tex. App. 2011) 
                                                                                                             
liability between one or more third party tortfeasors 
(against whom recovery may be had) and the plaintiff’s 
employer (against whom recovery may neither be sought 
nor allowed).”); Morris v. Lenihan, 192 F.R.D. 484, 492 
(E.D. Pa. 2000) (“[A]pportionment may only take place 
among parties that are properly in the case.”). 
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(“Section 33.003 requires the trier of fact to determine 
the percentage of responsibility for each claimant, 
defendant, settling person, and responsible third party 
who “caus[ed] or contribut[ed] to cause in any way the 
harm for which recovery of damages is sought . . . .”). So 
if Tennessee or Texas law applies, then KBR’s 
contributory-negligence defense introduces a 
nonjusticiable issue as long as KBR can show that Staff 
Sergeant Maseth acted negligently. 
KBR must be able to show that Staff Sergeant 
Maseth acted negligently for its contributory-negligence 
defense to introduce a nonjusticiable issue into this case 
under Tennessee or Texas law. If he was not negligent, 
then there is no need to determine the degree of fault for 
which the military is responsible. As explained, only the 
comparison of Staff Sergeant Maseth’s negligence to that 
of KBR’s and the military’s implicates nonjusticiable 
issues. Deciding whether the staff sergeant was negligent 
does not. This, like the assumption-of-risk defense, 
depends entirely on factual questions regarding his 
knowledge of the risk and the availability of alternative 
showers. Unlike in Taylor, where the injured party’s 
alleged negligence was that party’s decision to ignore a 
strategic military decision about the number of generators 
a tank ramp needed, 658 F.3d at 410–11, there is no 
evidence that Staff Sergeant Maseth was second-guessing 
a military decision about showering by using the shower 
in his barracks. So if the District Court concludes that 
 44 
 
Tennessee or Texas law applies, then the fact finder must 
first determine whether Staff Sergeant Maseth was 
negligent. If he was, then the case must be dismissed as 
nonjusticiable. If he was not, then the case will proceed 
to the merits.  
2. The Remaining Political-Question Factors 
Resolution of the remaining political-question 
factors—whether this case presents issues that lack 
judicially manageable standards or that cannot be 
resolved without affording respect to the coordinate 
branches of government—turns on the same analysis. 
Both of these bases for nonjusticiability are inextricable 
from this case if the fact finder must evaluate the wisdom 
of the military’s housing and maintenance decisions. And 
regarding the lack of a judicially manageable standard, 
“it is difficult to conceive of an area of governmental 
activity in which the courts have less competence. The 
complex, subtle, and professional decisions as to the 
composition, training, equipping, and control of a 
military force are essentially professional military 
judgments.” Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973). 
Housing and maintenance decisions on a battlefield are 
exactly this type of decision—complex, subtle, and 
professional decisions within the military’s professional 
judgment and beyond courts’ competence. For this same 
reason, resolving a case requiring evaluation of these 
decisions would also fail to express the respect due to the 
coordinate branches of government. See Aktepe v. United 
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States, 105 F.3d 1400, 1404 (11th Cir. 1997) (explaining 
that such respect is not shown when courts “subject[] [the 
political branches’] discretionary military and foreign 
policy decisions to judicial scrutiny, notwithstanding the 
judiciary’s relative lack of expertise in these areas”). 
Whether this case includes an issue whose 
resolution would express a lack of respect or that lacks a 
manageable standard thus turns on whether a strategic 
military decision must be reviewed. This is the same 
question that controlled our earlier analysis of whether 
this case contains an issue textually committed to another 
branch. Consequently, the remaining political-question 
factors will be inextricable from this case only if the case 
presents an issue textually committed to another branch. 
As a result, if Pennsylvania law controls, then this case 
lacks any nonjusticiable issues. But if either Tennessee or 
Texas law controls, then the case contains nonjusticiable 
issues that require eliminating any damages based on 
proportional liability. In such instance, if Staff Sergeant 
Maseth is found contributorily negligent, the case should 
be dismissed. 
B. Section 2860(j) Combatant-Activities Preemption 
 The District Court alternatively held that the 
plaintiffs’ claims are preempted by the combatant-
activities exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act. The 
Federal Tort Claims Act waives the United States’ 
sovereign immunity for many tort claims against it. 28 
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U.S.C. § 2674. But that waiver contains numerous 
exceptions, one of which—the combatant-activities 
exception—is raised here. Under the combatant-activities 
exception, the United States remains immune from 
“[a]ny claim arising out of the combatant activities of the 
military or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during time 
of war.” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j). Of course, defense 
contractors are not part of the government, so concepts 
like sovereign immunity, waiver of sovereign immunity, 
and exceptions to waiver do not apply directly to defense 
contractors. In fact, the Federal Tort Claims Act says as 
much. 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (stating that “Federal agency” 
“does not include any contractor with the United States”). 
 But the Supreme Court has held that the Act’s 
exceptions sometimes express federal policies that 
impliedly preempt state claims against defense 
contractors providing services to the military. In Boyle v. 
United Technologies, the Court held that another 
exception—§ 2860(a)’s discretionary-function 
exception—provides a federal policy that preempts state 
tort law interfering with it. 487 U.S. at 511–12. The 
question before the Court was whether a claim for 
defective design against a helicopter manufacturer was 
preempted. Id. at 503. The Court first recognized that 
there is a federal interest in federal-government contracts 
with private parties that is implicated in suits by private 
parties against a government contractor for conduct 
resulting from the government contract. Id. at 504–07.  
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 To determine whether the plaintiff’s state claim 
conflicted with this federal interest, the Court relied on 
the discretionary-function exception to establish the 
scope of the preempting policy. Id. at 510–11. This 
exception prevents suits against the United States for 
“[a]ny claim . . . based upon the exercise or performance 
or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary 
function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an 
employee of the Government, whether or not the 
discretion involved be abused.” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). 
From this exception, the Court derived a federal policy 
for avoiding second-guessing government decisions that 
“often involve[] not merely engineering analysis but 
judgment as to the balancing of many technical, military, 
and even social considerations.” Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511. 
And because state design-defect claims against 
“contractors would produce the same effect sought to be 
avoided by the FTCA exception,” id., these claims must 
also be preempted.  
 Importantly, the Court did not determine whether 
the state laws in question were preempted by simply 
applying the statute as if the contractor were the federal 
government. Instead, it created a three-part test designed 
to protect the federal policy underlying § 2680(a). Id. 
at 512 (holding that state claims against procurement 
contractors are preempted if “(1) the United States 
approved reasonably precise specifications; (2) the 
equipment conformed to those specifications; and (3) the 
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supplier warned the United States about the dangers in 
the use of the equipment that were known to the supplier 
but not to the United States”). 
 To decide how Boyle applies to § 2680(j), we must 
undertake the same analytic process. Boyle’s analysis 
involved three steps: (1) identify a unique federal interest 
that is associated with a FTCA exception, (2) determine 
the scope of the policy that underlies the exception, and 
(3) derive a test that ensures preemption of state laws that 
frustrate this policy. The two circuits that have 
confronted this agree that § 2680(j) represents a unique 
federal interest in the management of wars. Saleh v. Titan 
Corp., 580 F.3d 1, 5–7 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Koohi, 976 F.2d 
at 1336–37. But they disagree over the scope of the 
federal policy underlying the exception and, as a 
consequence, what test should follow. 
 The Ninth Circuit, in Koohi, held that “one 
purpose of the combatant activities exception is to 
recognize that during wartime encounters no duty of 
reasonable care is owed to those against whom force is 
directed as a result of authorized military action.” 976 
F.2d at 1337. By contrast, in Saleh, the D.C. Circuit held 
that “the policy embodied by the combatant activities 
exception is simply the elimination of tort from the 
battlefield, both to preempt state or foreign regulation of 
federal wartime conduct and to free military commanders 
from the doubts and uncertainty inherent in potential 
subjection to civil suit.” 580 F.3d at 7. This latter, more 
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expansive, policy is partially based on § 2680(j)’s use of 
“arising out of,” which we know from “workmen’s 
compensation statutes to denote any causal connection,” 
id. at 6.  
 There is very little authority for us to rely on to 
resolve this disagreement. The Federal Tort Claims Act 
does not explicitly state the purpose of the exception, nor 
does legislative history exist to shed light on it. Johnson 
v. United States, 170 F.2d 767, 769 (9th Cir. 1948) (“An 
examination of the record fails to produce clear evidence 
of Congressional intent or policy which might guide us 
toward a proper interpretation of [§ 2680(j)].”). We agree 
with the D.C. Circuit that the phrase “arising out of” 
suggests that this immunity is quite broad. As a result, 
the Ninth Circuit’s statement of purpose, limiting the 
policy to foreclosing any “duty of reasonable care . . . to 
those against whom force is directed,” is too narrow16—
which is well demonstrated by the fact that the plain 
language would prevent suits against the military for 
harm it causes through friendly fire. 
 This leaves the D.C. Circuit’s articulation of the 
purpose, which we find persuasive in some respects. We 
                                                 
16
 In fairness, the Ninth Circuit describes its articulated 
purpose as “one purpose,” Koohi, 976 F.2d at 1337, 
which means that the court may recognize that there are 
other, broader purposes as well. 
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agree that the statute represents a federal policy to 
prevent state regulation of the military’s battlefield 
conduct and decisions. See Saleh, 580 F.3d at 7 
(explaining that § 2680(j) reveals Congress’ intent to 
“preempt state or foreign regulation of federal wartime 
conduct and to free military commanders from the doubts 
and uncertainty inherent in potential subjection to civil 
suit”). But we do not go as far as the D.C. Circuit’s 
holding that § 2680(j) reveals a policy of “the elimination 
of tort from the battlefield.” Id. at 7; see also id. (“The 
very purposes of tort law are in conflict with the pursuit 
of warfare.”). This broader statement loses sight of the 
fact that § 2680(j), as a part of the Federal Tort Claims 
Act, does not provide immunity to nongovernmental 
actors. So to say that Congress intended to eliminate all 
tort law is too much, which the D.C. Circuit itself 
implicitly recognizes by crafting a test that does not 
preempt state tort claims challenging contractors’ 
performance of certain kinds of contracts. Id. at 9–10. 
 The purpose underlying § 2680(j) therefore is to 
foreclose state regulation of the military’s battlefield 
conduct and decisions. With this policy in mind, we turn 
to the last step of the Boyle framework: deriving a test to 
decide which state claims are preempted. The D.C. 
Circuit articulates one test: “During wartime, where a 
private service contractor is integrated into combatant 
activities over which the military retains command 
authority, a tort claim arising out of the contractor’s 
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engagement in such activities shall be preempted.” Id. 
at 9. KBR urges us to adopt the Solicitor General’s two-
part test: (1) “whether a claim against the United States 
alleging similar conduct would be within the FTCA’s 
exception for combatant activities,” and (2) “whether the 
contractor was acting within the scope of its contractual 
relationship with the federal government at the time of 
the incident out of which the claim arose.” Br. for the 
United States as Amicus Curiae, Al Shimari v. CACI 
Int’l, Inc., Nos. 09-1335, 10-1891, 10-1921, at 17–19 
(4th Cir. Jan. 14, 2012)).  
We adopt the D.C. Circuit’s combatant-activities, 
command-authority test because it best suits the purpose 
of § 2680(j). The Solicitor General’s test is overinclusive. 
The latter test, by preempting combatant-activity-related 
contractor conduct so long as the conduct is within the 
“scope of [the contractor’s] contractual relationship,” 
would insulate contractors from liability even when their 
conduct does not result from military decisions or orders. 
The Solicitor General makes this clear by explaining that 
under his approach, “federal preemption would generally 
apply even if an employee of a contractor allegedly 
violated the terms of the contract . . . as long as the 
alleged conduct at issue was within the scope of the 
contractual relationship.” Id. at 20 (defining scope by 
analogy to the Westfall Act and Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 
564 (1959) (plurality opinion)). A scope of preemption 
that includes contractors’ contractual violations is too 
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broad to fit § 2680(j)’s purpose because the conduct 
underlying these violations is necessarily made 
independently of the military’s battlefield conduct and 
decisions. After all, if the contractors’ conduct did follow 
from the military’s decisions or orders, then the conduct 
would presumably not be in violation of the contract. 
State regulation of these violations thus does not 
constitute the regulation of the military’s battlefield 
conduct or decisions that § 2680(j) is meant to prevent. 
The combatant-activities, command-authority test, 
in contrast, is well-tailored to the purpose underlying 
§ 2680(j): The first prong—whether the contractor is 
integrated into the military’s combatant activities—
ensures that preemption occurs only when battlefield 
decisions are at issue. And the second prong—whether 
the contractor’s actions were the result of the military’s 
retention of command authority—properly differentiates 
between the need to insulate the military’s battlefield 
decisions from state regulation and the permissible 
regulation of harm resulting solely from contractors’ 
actions.  
Under the combatant-activities, command-
authority test we adopt, the plaintiffs’ claims are not 
preempted. As to the combatant-activities prong, KBR’s 
maintenance of electrical systems at a barracks in an 
active war zone qualifies as integration into the military’s 
combatant activities. The plaintiffs contend otherwise, 
arguing that this maintenance is not a combatant activity 
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because it does not include actual combat such that it 
“arises from combatant activities of the military or naval 
forces.” This takes too narrow a view of the phrase 
“combatant activities.” As the Ninth Circuit explained, 
combatant activities “include not only physical violence, 
but activities both necessary to and in direct connection 
with actual hostilities.” Johnson, 170 F.2d at 770. As an 
example, the Court explained that “[t]he act of supplying 
ammunition to fighting vessels in a combat area during 
war is undoubtedly a ‘combatant activity.’” Id. 
Maintaining the electrical systems for a barracks in an 
active war zone is analogous to supplying ammunition to 
fighting vessels in a combat area and is certainly 
“necessary to and in direct connection” to the hostilities 
engaged in by the troops living in those barracks. The 
plaintiffs’ argument is thus unpersuasive and the first 
prong of the test is satisfied. 
This case is ultimately not preempted, however, 
because the second prong is not satisfied. The military 
did not retain command authority over KBR’s installation 
and maintenance of the pump because, as explained 
above, the relevant contracts and work orders did not 
prescribe how KBR was to perform the work required of 
it. Instead, the contracts and the work orders provided for 
general requirements or objectives and then gave KBR 
considerable discretion in deciding how to satisfy them. 
See supra text accompanying note 4. As the D.C. Circuit 
explained, these types of contracts are “performance-
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based” contracts that “‘describe the work in terms of the 
required results rather than either “how” the work is to be 
accomplished or the number of hours to be provided.’” 
Saleh, 580 F.3d at 10 (quoting 48 C.F.R. § 37.602(b)(1)). 
“[B]y definition, the military [cannot] retain command 
authority nor operational control over contractors 
working on [this] basis and thus tort suits against such 
contractors [are] not [ ] preempted” under the combatant-
activities, command-authority test. Id. The considerable 
discretion KBR had in deciding how to complete the 
maintenance at issue here thus prevents the plaintiffs’ 
suit from being preempted because the military did not 
retain command authority over KBR’s actions.  
III 
 We will remand to the District Court for 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. The plaintiffs’ 
claims are not preempted by the combatant-activities 
exception, and it is possible that those claims are not 
foreclosed by the political-question doctrine. To decide 
the latter issue, the District Court will first need to decide 
which state’s law applies. If Pennsylvania law applies, 
then this case lacks any nonjusticiable issues and may 
proceed. But if either Tennessee or Texas law applies, 
then the case contains nonjusticiable issues. At the least, 
in that situation, the District Court will need to eliminate 
any damages that are based on proportional liability but 
allow the case to move forward to provide such other 
remedies as may exist. At most, the case will be 
 55 
 
dismissed if Staff Sergeant Maseth is first found 
contributorily negligent. 
 
